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Cross-country polarisation in CO2 emissions per capita in the European 
Union: changes and explanatory factors 
 
Abstract  
We analyse the degree of polarisation in the international distribution of CO2 
emissions per capita in the European Union. It is analytically relevant to 
examine the degree of instability inherent to a distribution and, in the analysed 
case, the likelihood that the distribution and its evolution will increase or 
decrease the chances of reaching an agreement on climate policy. Two 
approaches were used to measure polarisation: the endogenous approach, in 
which countries are grouped according to their similarity in terms of emissions, 
and the exogenous approach, in which countries are grouped geographically. 
Our findings indicate a clear decrease in polarisation since the mid-1990s, 
which can essentially be explained by the fact that the different groups have 
converged (i.e. antagonism among the CO2 emitters has decreased) as the 
contribution of energy intensity to between-group differences has decreased. 
This lower degree of polarisation in CO2 distribution suggests a situation more 
conducive to the possibility of reaching EU-wide agreements on the mitigation 
of CO2 emissions. 
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The concept of polarisation is associated with the degree to which the 
distribution of a given variable tends to cluster around homogeneous poles 
which are distant from one another. A distribution is highly polarised when there 
are few poles, each large in size, and a high degree of antagonism between 
them. Interest in this phenomenon, and in measuring it, is due to its link to the 
potential for conflict. Moreover, as demonstrated by Esteban and Ray (1994), 
this concept is also fundamentally different from that of inequality (Cowell, 
1995). Inequality indexes only measure the degree of dispersion of 
observations and so do not capture the degree of antagonism between groups 
as polarisation does. There may be a case in which overall inequality declined 
but the observations of a distribution—CO2 emissions per capita of different 
countries in our case—formed more homogeneous groups around different 
poles. In these circumstances, this reduction in inequality within groups could 
be linked to more conflicts of interest and antagonism between different groups, 
which will be reflected in an increase in polarisation indexes.  
 
Because polarisation is associated with the potential for conflict, it is an 
especially relevant concept for the analysis of scenarios in which agents must 
negotiate and reach agreements. This is the case for the agreements on how to 
distribute, among the various European Union countries, the necessary efforts 
to reduce CO2 emissions in order to meet the mitigation objectives assumed by 
the European Union as a political unit. Specifically, it would seem reasonable to 
assume that, all other factors being equal, greater polarisation of the distribution 
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of CO2 emissions among European Union countries would mean less cohesion 
around effort-sharing proposals and greater difficulty in reaching agreements. 
Conversely, lower polarisation would mean closer interests of the different 
countries, fewer conflicting views on the criteria that should be used to distribute 
emission reduction efforts among countries and thus more opportunities to 
reach agreements on how to share the burden of mitigation. Furthermore, it 
should be noticed that mitigation agreements can also influence the evolution of 
polarisation with consequences on the possibility to achieve new agreements. 
 
The European Union has demonstrated greater commitment to the struggle 
against climate change than any other political community to date. In March 
2007, the European Council committed to reducing greenhouse-gas emissions 
by at least 20% (compared to 1990 levels) by 2020, with the option of raising 
the target to 30% if the other high-income countries agreed to a comparable 
objective. Nevertheless, there is great inequality among the various EU 
countries in terms of emissions per capita, the ambition to meet the set goals, 
and stances with regard to the criteria to be applied in the distribution of efforts. 
The emission-reduction efforts required of the various member states in order to 
meet the 2020 target were not established until April 2009 (Decision no. 
406/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council). The effort-sharing 
discussions were complicated, and conflicts arose between the objectives of 
various groups of countries (as, for example, at the European summit of 
October 2008 in Brussels, where a group of eight Eastern European countries 
called into question whether the previously agreed objectives should be 
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maintained).1 Similar processes of negotiation and conflict had already occurred 
in the Kyoto discussions among the then 15 EU member states leading up to 
the adoption of the 8% reduction target. Today, due to the larger number of 
member states and the diverse range of situations they bring to the table, as 
well as the need to reach increasingly ambitious goals in the future, it is more 
important than ever to analyse the various factors that can increase or decrease 
the likelihood of reaching agreements at an EU level.  
 
Given the potential importance of the subject, it seems worthwhile to conduct a 
quantitative assessment of the evolution of the polarisation of emissions of the 
various European Union countries. The literature describes two main 
approaches for measuring polarisation. The first of these is the endogenous 
approach, in which groups (of countries, in our case) are formed on the basis of 
similarities, using mechanisms aimed at minimising intra-group differences. The 
polarisation indices developed by Esteban and Ray (1994) and Esteban et al. 
(2007) for multiple-pole cases and by Wolfson (1994, 1997) and Wang and Tsui 
(2000) for the specific bipolar case are commonly cited examples of this 
approach. The second is the exogenous approach, comprising methods in 
which groups are determined ex-ante, for instance on the basis of geographical 
criteria. One example is the method proposed by Zhang and Kanbur (2001), 
which is based on inequality decomposition by population subgroups 
(Shorrocks, 1984).  
 
                                                 
1
 Specifically, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, with Italy later joining the 
group. The governments of these countries questioned whether the goals should be so ambitious and rejected the 
adoption of measures that did not adequately respect the various countries’ differences in terms of economic potential.  
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This concept has previously been applied to the analysis of environmental 
distribution by Ezcurra (2007) and Duro and Padilla (2008), who analyse 
polarisation in the international distribution of CO2 emissions using the indices 
proposed by Esteban et al. (2007), and by Duro (2010), in a paper analysing 
international polarisation by means of the exogenous approach, which also 
made it possible to carry out a factor decomposition analysis. Ezcurra (2007) 
also uses non-parametric tools for analyzing polarisation through Kernel density 
function estimates (based on Quah, 1997). In the present study, we carry out 
the first polarisation analysis for the European Union—a 27-country political unit 
that has adopted mitigation objectives—using both the exogenous and 
endogenous approaches, with a view to gaining a more complete understanding 
of the situation. Specifically, we analyse the polarisation of CO2 emissions per 
capita in the European Union from 1990 to 2007.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review the main 
methodological aspects associated with the measurement and decomposition of 
polarisation. In Section 3, we provide empirical evidence derived from the 
application of polarisation measures to the case of CO2 emissions in European 




2. Methodological aspects 
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Esteban and Ray (1994) suggest defining distributive polarisation in terms of 
the degree to which the observations (in our case countries) concentrate around 
opposing groups. This notion, which approaches the fracture of a given 
distribution, seems highly related to the probability of emergence of conflicts. In 
this sense, it seems interesting to have statistical measures showing the degree 
of polarisation present in distributions and thereby offer a quantitative approach 
to distributive inherent instability2. In this regard, the literature has made several 
contributions, which can be grouped into two major categories. The first 
category comprises methods in which groups are formed optimally, with the aim 
of minimising within-group heterogeneity. In this case, the groups of 
observations are therefore not set ex ante, for example, with regional or 
geographical criteria, but are formed according to information on the 
characteristics of observations. This category includes the ER indices, proposed 
by Esteban and Ray (1994), and the EGR indices, proposed by Esteban et al. 
(2007), both designed for general cases of polarisation (i.e., for any number of 
pre-established groups), as well as the measures proposed by Wolfson (1994, 
1997) and Wang and Tsui (2000), designed specifically for analysing strictly the 
bipolar case. The second category includes the Z-K index, proposed by Zhang 
and Kanbur (2001). In this case, the pre-defined groups and the related 
measures are calculated without discussing the relevance of these groupings. 
For example, if the country analysis clustering was related to immediate 
regional areas because of their possible internal homogeneity. 
 
                                                 
2
 The non-parametric techniques for analysing the shape and dynamics of a distribution—in other words, density 
function estimation— are unable to obtain precise quantitative information about changes in polarisation over time 
(Ezcurra, 2007). 
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Whatever the case, all the methods for measuring polarisation, regardless of 
category, satisfy two basic propositions. First, the measured polarisation 
increases as within-group inequality decreases; in other words, greater internal 
cohesion strengthens group identification and therefore increases the potential 
for conflict (“identification effect”). Second, the measured polarisation increases 
as the distance (antagonism) between the groups increases (“alienation effect”).  
 
With the notation adapted to the analysis of CO2 emissions, the EGR indices 
would formally be defined as:  














  G Gs   (1) 
where pi and pj are the relative populations of countries i and j; ei and ej are the 
CO2 emissions per capita of countries i and j; e is the European Union average 
(in our case);  is the parameter that measures the sensitivity of the index to 
polarisation, the value of which falls between 1 and 1.6;  is a parameter 
showing the measure’s sensitivity to the groups’ level of cohesion; G is the Gini 
coefficient of the original distribution; and Gs is the Gini coefficient of the 
grouped distribution (between-group inequality). The higher the value of , the 
greater the conceptual difference between EGR and the Gini coefficient.  
 
The measure has two addends. The first addend corresponds to the ER index, 
which is axiomatically derived using a behavioural model (Esteban and Ray, 
1994). The second addend takes into account the error committed when the 
observations are grouped and the distribution is simplified by poles, thereby 
incorporating a statistical approach into the measurement of polarisation. 
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Specifically, this second addend is equal to the difference between the overall 
inequality and the between-group inequality, and therefore provides an intuitive 
estimate of the degree of within-group inequality (i.e., a proxy of the error 
associated to grouping). The parameter β weights this error component ( = G – 
Gs) in the general value of the measure. Thus, following Duro (2005), it would 
be reasonable to set  at a value of 1, mainly because the EGR and Gini 
expressions are similar and, as we see, the EGR contains Gini indexes.  
 
Before the aforementioned formula can be applied, we must define the cut-off 
points between the groups (which are exhaustive and mutually exclusive), thus 
obtaining a simplified representation of the original distribution. As an example, 
one reasonable option would be to establish these boundaries following the 
method proposed by Davies and Shorrocks (1989), in which the cut-off point 
between groups is defined by the average weighted emission (income in the 
original formulation) of the two adjacent groups.  
 
The EGR measures seem, for various reasons, to be preferable to those 
proposed by Wolfson (1994, 1997) and Wang and Tsui (2000). First, they are 
theoretically derived from the establishment of conflict models. Second, they 
can be applied not only to the examination of bipolarisation, but also to the 
general analysis of polarisation.  
 
It may also be of interest to analyse the degree of polarisation when groups are 
determined ex-ante according to some reasonable criterion, such as 
geographical location; for instance. Zhang and Kanbur (2001) suggested a 
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polarisation measure based on the inequality decomposition by groups 
(Shorrocks, 1980, 1984). Thus, they use the fact that the inter-group inequality 
(Tb) measures the degree of antagonism (positively related to the degree of 
polarisation and conflict) and that intra-group inequality (Tw) approximates the 
degree of internal cohesion and therefore the group identification (positively 
related to the degree of polarisation and conflict) to derive a summary measure 
such as the following: 

































where g denotes a group, pg is the population share of group g, eg is the 
average emissions per capita for group g, and Tg is the internal inequality of 
group g.  
 
Note that the numerator reflects the magnitude of the heterogeneity between 
the groups, like the alienation effect in the EGR approach, while the 
denominator reflects the magnitude of the internal heterogeneities, like the 
identification effect. Thus, growth in the between-groups component (i.e. groups 
becoming more antagonistic) consistently tends to increase the value of the 
measure, whereas an increase in internal heterogeneity (i.e. less identification) 
tends to reduce it.  
 
This measure also behaves differently from conventional inequality measures 
such as the Gini or the Theil index (see Cowell, 1995). Specifically, the 
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discrepancy is associated with the different role attributed to intra-group 
inequality. There is a positive relationship between intra-group inequality and 
the global inequality approach, but it is negative in the polarisation approach. 
For practical purposes, therefore, a significant variation of the within-group 
component could lead to inconsistent patterns between inequality measures 
and the Z-K measure.3  
 
An essential aspect, for analytical purposes, is that the between-group 
inequality component can in turn be decomposed by multiplicative factors, such 
as the factors of the Kaya identity (1989), according to the methodology 
proposed by Duro and Padilla (2006). The same procedure can also be 
performed in the within-groups component, given that it is simply a weighted 
average of inequality indices. Therefore, as Duro (2010) noted, we can evaluate 
the sources of change in the value of the Z-K index by decomposing its group 
components. The methodology proposed by Duro and Padilla (2006) first 
measures the partial contribution of each factor to overall inequality as the 
quantity of inequality that would persist if only the examined factor changed 
among countries, taking the other factors equal to the mean. Thus the perfect 
decomposition of inequality is achieved by adding two interaction components, 
showing the joint contribution of the factors to inequality.  
 
 
3. Empirical evidence 
 
                                                 
3
 Analyses of international distribution of emissions that use the inequality approach include Heil and Wodon (1997), 
Hedenus and Azar (2005), Padilla and Serrano (2006) and Duro and Padilla (2006). 
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3.1. Endogenous groups 
 
Let us begin by analysing the changes in CO2 emissions per capita in the 
European Union between 1990 and 2007. The data—provided by the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) (2010a)—refer to metric tons of CO2 
emissions from fossil-fuel combustion. Emissions per European Union 
inhabitant dropped by 7.8% over the period (Figure 1). The emissions dropped 
most sharply between 1990 and 1994 and, despite fluctuations, the trend since 
1994 has been towards stabilisation at around 8 metric tons. Changes in 
emissions per capita from 1990 to 2007 were more positive in the European 
Union than in the world as a whole, with the latter registering a 10% increase 
during the same period.4 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Before offering the polarisation calculations, it might be useful to build the 
density function of the distribution of CO2 per capita in EU countries through 
non-parametric techniques. This gives us a visual indication of the shape of the 
distribution and its evolution throughout the period5. Figure 2 reproduces the 
kernel estimates for four selected years of the period: 1990, 1995, 2000 and 
                                                 
4
 Nevertheless, it should be noted that per capita emissions in the European Union were 80% higher than the world 
average in 2007. 
5
 The estimates are based on Gaussian kernel functions (see Quah, 1997). These have been used previously for the 
analysis of the international distribution of emissions by Padilla and Serrano (2006) and Ezcurra (2007). The smoothing 
parameter is determined endogenously from the method of Silverman (1986). It should be noted that the results did not 
vary significantly with the use of other functions. 
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20076. We find, for example, that the distribution of CO2 emissions per capita in 
the EU in 2007 is clearly unimodal, with the bulk of the population by countries 
around the average distribution. Whatever the case, the most interesting figure 
is the pattern of evolution in time. Visually, there are two characteristics: first, 
the mode has shifted toward higher relative levels since 1990, and, second, the 
distribution seems to have moved from a bimodal format to the aforementioned 
one-peak7. This evolution, with the tendency to compaction of two modes at a 
time, should be quantified in terms of a reduction of polarisation. In either case, 
we need to know the values of synthetic indexes associated with the 
measurement of this polarisation feature. 
 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Let us now analyse the evolution of polarisation that has accompanied the 
changes in emissions in the European Union. If, for example, the overall 
reduction in emissions per capita had coincided with an increase in polarisation, 
then tensions could be expected to arise among the countries, against a 
backdrop of the need to reach mitigation agreements.  
 
First, we computed the values of the EGR family of indices (generalised 
polarisation measure) for the international distribution of CO2 emissions per 
capita between 1990 and 2007. In order to test the robustness of the 
calculations, we considered three different values for the parameter  for the 
                                                 
6
 The density functions were estimated for every year in the period. The results are available from the authors upon 
request.  
7
 This can be formally confirmed through multimodality texts (see Bianchi, 1997).. 
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cases of two (Table 1), three (Table 3) and four groups (Table 5), respectively—
the cases that, according to the literature, seemed most reasonable. The value 
of  was set at 1, according to Duro (2005). The appendix shows the 
composition of the groups of countries obtained endogenously by means of the 
optimisation procedure suggested by Davies and Shorrocks (1989)8.  
 
In all cases an increase in the value of EGR indexes is indicative of an increase 
in polarisation. Tables 1, 3 and 5 include the values of the ER index (the first 
term of the expression (1)) and the error term emerged by grouping. Thus, an 
increase in the ER index value tends to increase the value of the EGR. 
Moreover, an increase of the error (ε) tends, ceteris paribus, to reduce the value 
of the EGR, as it helps to reduce intra-group cohesion. 
 
The results indicate a certain stability of values towards the mid-1990s, and a 
considerable non-monotonic decrease since then (Tables 1, 3 and 5). This 
pattern holds regardless of the parameterisation used for  and the number of 
groups. For example, the two-group EGR decreases by 38% when  = 1, by 
42% when  = 1.3, and by 49% when  = 1.6; the three-group EGR decreases 
                                                 
8 In particular, these authors suggest an algorithm to establish the groups so as to maximise inter-group inequality and, 
therefore, be as close as possible to the overall inequality. This procedure thus involves minimising the quantity of intra-
group inequalities. The programme used to limit them was built using GaussView software. Obviously, other 
endogenous grouping criteria could have been used, such as the clustering procedure suggested in Phillips and Sul 
(2007). However, our understanding is that the mechanism established by Davies and Shorrocks is not only intuitive but 
more consistent with the approach of polarisation suggested by Esteban and Ray (1994). 
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by 27%, 31% and 35%; and the four-group EGR decreases by 22%, 23% and 
25%, respectively.9  
 
Let us now consider the role of changes in relative weights and relative 
emissions (between-groups distance) by groups in determining the evolution of 
the ER component. Thus, if the relative populations are equalised and/or the 
distances between groups increase, polarisation tends to grow. In the bipolar 
case (Table 2), we can clearly discern the role of the lower degree of alienation, 
given that the groups of countries with the lowest and highest levels of relative 
emissions are both close to the mean. In particular, the process of convergence 
to the mean associated with the low-emissions groups is mainly explained by 
the increase in relative emissions produced in Spain and Italy. Also, the 
convergence pattern made by the high-emissions group is mainly determined 
by the decrease in relative emissions experienced by Germany and, in second 
place, by the UK and Poland. In the three-group case (Table 4) we see a similar 
effect, with the middle and high groups approaching the mean (in the first case 
explained by the overall reduction of relative emissions and in the latter case by 
the approach to the mean made by Germany), but also a weighting effect due to 
the increased size of the middle group (due to the inclusion of Spain and Italy) 
10.  
                                                 
9
 The level of polarisation of emissions is considerably lower in the European Union than in the world as a whole (Duro 
and Padilla, 2008), regardless of the number of groups analysed and the value of the parameters. Moreover, the EGR 
value with parameters  = 1 and  = 1 can be compared with the Gini coefficient, which moves in a range between 0 
and 1. In this case, the polarisation values do not seem excessive. However, for example, the polarisation of emissions 
is higher than the regional polarization in Europe in terms of GDP per capita (Ezcurra et al., 2007).  
10
 It is easy to understand that the role of countries depends on their relative weight (population-share) and their relative 
emissions per capita. In this case, the convergence to the mean process made by large countries such as Germany and 
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In addition, an analysis of the error term () reveals that variations in this term 
over time have a limited impact on reducing the aforementioned polarisation. In 
the bipolar and four-group cases, the value of the error in 2007 is very similar to 
that obtained in 1990. In the three-group case, variations in the error term are 
somewhat greater, but their contribution to the decrease in polarisation is 
significantly smaller than the contribution of changes in the aforementioned 
relative weights and relative emissions. Thus, in global terms, the generalised 
evolution of polarisation can be attributed to the simplified polarisation 
component.  
 
An interesting issue to analyse is whether the Kyoto agreement has influenced 
the evolution of polarisation. Mitigation agreements take into account emission 
distribution—involving greater reductions to greater polluters—and so may 
cause a polarisation reduction by inducing a reduction in between-group 
inequality that may, in turn, facilitate new agreements. If we analyse in detail 
Figure 3, it is not clear that this mechanism has worked in the observed 
reduction in polarisation. The decreasing trend in polarisation starts in 1994, 
before the Kyoto agreement. There is also an important reduction in polarisation 
between 1997 and 1999, and a stabilisation afterwards. However, we are not 
able to ascertain whether this second reduction in polarisation between 1997 
and 1999 is directly related to the signing of the Kyoto protocol in December 
                                                                                                                                               
United Kingdom (which reduce their CO2 relative emissions per capita from 1.40 to 1.23 in 1990 and 2007 and from 
1.13 to 1.09, respectively) and Spain and Italy (which move from 0.61 to 0.97 and 0.82 to 0.93, respectively) largely 
explain the reduction in levels of polarization. More details about the role of the different countries are available from the 
authors on request. 
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1997. Our view is that the impact of the measures derived from the protocol on 
the distribution of emissions would be posterior, when the policy measures 
associated with the agreement were developed and could have impacted on the 
emissions of different countries11.  
 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Note that the different endogenous groupings have a high explanatory capacity. 
In the two-group case, inter-group differences account for 70% of the overall 
international inequalities (Table 6); this explanatory capacity reaches 89% in the 
three-group case and 94% in the four-group case. The limited increase in 
explanatory capacity as the number of groups increases beyond three leads us 
to prefer the three-group simplification. In any event, as Esteban et al. (2007) 
noted, the value of the generalised polarisation itself provides clues as to the 
most appropriate grouping. The analysis clearly indicates that the two- and 
                                                 
11 Whatever the case, we consider that agreements should be designed to take into account their potential impact on 
polarisation as, following our hypothesis, a reduction of polarisation would facilitate later agreements. 
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three-group cases are superior to the four-group case, but does not 
conclusively point to a general preference between the two- and three-group 
cases. Thus, with the exception of the past few years, the two-group 
simplification seems to be the most appropriate option. However, in the interest 
of maintaining explanatory capacity, the three-group option is the preferred form 
of analysis for the most recent years of the study period (Table 6).  
 
 
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
As the groups are formed according to the differences in emissions per capita, 
which is also the main criterion explaining the differences in emission reduction 
targets, the group of lower emissions tends logically to include the countries 
with less stringent commitments, while the group of higher emissions is the one 
that contains most of the countries with more stringent commitments (see Table 
A.1)12. There are, however, various exceptions such as Austria, Ireland or 
Finland―and there is no clear divide, as the reduction targets are far from being 
proportional to the differences in emissions per capita13. 
 
An analysis of the evolution of inequality—a distribution concept that is, as 
mentioned above, fundamentally different from polarisation—reveals, in the 
                                                 
12 The two-group classification used by Duro and Padilla (2008) in their analysis of international polarisation was very 
similar to the classification between Annex B and others. There was a clear correlation between the industrialised 
countries conforming to Annex B—the ones committed to controlling their emissions—and the group of countries with 
greater emissions per capita. 
13
 Moreover, it should be taken into account that the Kyoto protocol was signed in 1997 when the emissions of several 
countries were quite different from 1990, especially in some economies in transition. 
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same period, a noticeable downward trend that is nonetheless generally more 
monotonic than the trend revealed by the polarisation measures (Figure 3). 
While the EGR indexes of polarisation for two, three, and four groups decrease 
by 42.1%, 30.6% and 23.2% respectively over the course of the study period; 
the Gini coefficient decreases by 20.3% and the Theil indexes (T(0) and T(1)) 
and the Coefficient of Variation (CV) (other well-known inequality indexes14) 
show an even larger reduction (32.2%, 35.2% and 43.6% respectively). 
Therefore, both distributive indicators (polarisation and inequality) show a clear 
downward trend.  
 
Table 7 shows the coefficients of correlation between selected polarisation and 
inequality indexes. Global correlation is positive and significant. However, these 
correlations do not invalidate the analysis for various reasons. First, as shown 
above, polarisation indexes measure a different concept than standard 
inequality indexes. Thus, in terms of the analysis of international distribution, it 
is of interest to know if both distributive dimensions, inequality and polarisation, 
change in the same direction (reinforcing each other) or not. Second, besides 
the general correlation found, there are some important specific differences. 
 
TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
Though the overall pattern is comparatively downward, significant disparities 
also emerge between the evolution of inequality and that of polarisation which 
are observed in more detail. In Table 8 some periods with significant 
                                                 
14
 See Cowell (1995) for a survey on inequality index properties. 
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discrepancies between the rates of polarisation and some well-known inequality 
indices have been identified. For example, while in the periods 1990–1992, 
1990–1993, 1999–2002 and 1990–1994 polarisation measures show a general 
increase, inequality indexes fell significantly.  
 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
 
For instance, the different evolution of inequality and polarisation in the period 
1990–1994 can be attributed to the changes in the within-group identification 
component. The reduction in within-group inequality would increase 
identification within a group and thus polarisation. Therefore, polarisation 
increases while inequality decreases for this period. In short, the increase in 
group cohesion is due to an increased cohesion in the group of higher 
emissions per capita, basically due to the convergence to the mean of Germany 
and Czech Republic. There is also an increase in group cohesion for the group 
of lower emissions, due to the process of convergence to the mean of Spain 
and Portugal. 
 
The analysis of both concepts helps to a better interpretation of the international 
distribution and to its analysis in terms of policy. For example, in the cited period 
the reduction in inequality coincides with an increase in polarisation that could 
make the distribution more conflictive, even though emissions are more evenly 
distributed. Thus, the increase in polarisation would offset the improvements in 
equity for this period.  
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3.2. Exogenous groups 
 
As a complement to our analysis of endogenous groups, it is of interest to 
analyse the polarisation found using ex-ante groups of countries. We selected 
geographical location as a reasonable criterion for the grouping. Specifically, we 
chose an apparently reasonable three-group structure that provides better 
results than other exogenous segmentation options15. We named the groups 
Europe North (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom), Europe East 
(Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) and Europe South (Cyprus, Greece, Italy, 
Malta, Portugal and Spain). Although this proposal is based on geographical, 
political and economic criteria rather than on an optimisation process as in the 
previous section, we find a degree of similarity between this analysis and that of 
the endogenous groups; note, for example, the degree of agreement with the 
other grouping for the year 200716 . 
                                                 
15 Obviously, other exogenous grouping criteria could have been used. The regional segmentation used in the paper 
was the one that provided better results in terms of the between-groups inequality component. We also checked the 
relevance of alternative exogenous groupings of EU countries using, for instance, as a benchmark indicator the average 
industrial structure (weight of manufacturing in GDP over the period 2004–2008). In all cases (groups) and years 
analysed the explanatory relevance of these groupings (estimated through the ratio Tbetween/Ttotal) was much lower 
than that associated with the regional groups finally considered in the text. For example, for the year 1990, the ratio 
associated with the chosen grouping was 33%, while it was only 10% for the best of cases using industrial structure as a 
reference indicator for forming the groups. Estimates are available from the authors upon request. 
16
 There are, however, several countries that do not fit this trend. This is the case, for example, of France and Sweden 
which, despite belonging to Europe North and having high per capita incomes, have lower emission levels due to the 
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For this analysis we used the Z-K index, which has the advantage of being 
decomposable, a characteristic which enables us to investigate which sources 
explain the overall polarisation results. Table 9 shows the results of the Z-K 
index for the aforementioned groups of EU countries. As in the case of EGRs, 
an increase in the value of the Z-K index is interpreted in terms of an increase in 
polarisation. As in the endogenous polarisation analysis, we find a clear overall 
decrease over the course of the study period: the value of the polarisation 
measure dropped from 0.50 in 1990 to 0.12 in 2007. This amounts to a 77% 
decrease, which is larger than the reduction calculated for the endogenous 
indices mentioned above.  
As previously stated, one of the advantages of these measures is that they can 
be decomposed immediately in order to understand the role of the identification 
component (proxied by within-group inequality) and the alienation component 
(proxied by between-group inequality). In this respect, an analysis of the group 
inequality components indicates that the bulk of the decrease can be attributed 
to the behaviour of the between-group component, which decreased by 79% 
during the study period, while the 9% decrease in within-group inequality helped 
to increase polarisation (by making the various groups somewhat more 
internally homogeneous). This result is in line with our intuitive interpretation of 
the endogenous polarisation analysis. Also, the rather low level reached by the 
between-group component indicates that any significant future reductions in 
polarisation would have to be based on an increase in the within-group 
                                                                                                                                               
importance of nuclear power and, in the case of Sweden, renewable energy sources. There are also various countries in 
the Europe East group which show very high emissions per capita, such as Estonia and Czech Republic. 
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component (in other words, a lower level of internal cohesion would prevent 
groups from forming around different interests).  
TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE 
 
Given the importance of the evolution of the between-group component in 
explaining the reduction in exogenous polarisation, it is of interest to investigate 
the factors behind this evolution. The Kaya identity (1989) enables us to 
decompose emissions per capita into three factors: carbon index (CO2 
emissions per unit of primary energy, CO2/PE), energy intensity (primary energy 
per GDP unit, PE/GDP), and affluence (GDP per capita, GDP/P). The 
methodology proposed by Duro and Padilla (2006) makes it possible to 
decompose the value of the Theil index of inequality in emissions per capita into 
the inequality attributable to the three Kaya factors plus two interaction terms. 
We applied this methodology to decompose the between-group inequality. 
 
The decomposition results shown in Table A.2 of the Appendix indicate that the 
partial contribution of energy intensity played an important role in the 
considerable decrease in inequality (81%). Nevertheless, the great importance 
of the interaction factors obliges us to consider their evolution as well, in order 
to account for the overall effect on the evolution of the components associated 
with the different Kaya factors. If we distribute the interaction components 
among the various factors that generate them following the criterion of 
Shorrocks (jointly generated, equally distributed), we obtain the results shown in 
Table 10. The lower contribution to inequality of energy intensity—which no 
longer plays anything like a leading role—largely explains the evolution of the 
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inequalities and offsets the greater contribution associated with the affluence 
factor.17 The negative component can be explained by the fact that the region 
with the greatest energy intensity tends to be the one with the lowest GDP per 
capita (note the significantly negative interaction factor in Table A.2), which 
results in these two inequalities cancelling each other out and, in the case of 
energy intensity, leading to a negative net contribution. Table 11 shows the 
characteristics of the different exogenous groups. 
 
TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE 
 
TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE 
 
Let us now examine the component associated with the energy intensity factor. 
The observed pattern can be explained by a relative reduction in energy 
intensity in the Europe East group in particular, paired with a relative increase 
for Europe South (this is in the context of reduced energy intensity for Europe 
as a whole: from 1990 to 2007, Europe went from 191 to 142 tonnes of oil 
equivalent per US$1 million for the year 2000 at purchasing power parity).18 
 
The within-group component is less relevant to explaining the evolution of 
polarisation in the European Union. This polarisation—which, as mentioned 
above, has tended to increase—can essentially be attributed to the smaller 
contribution of GDP per capita to within-group inequality (Table 12). The groups 
                                                 
17
 See Padilla and Duro (2011) for a more detailed analysis of the decomposition of inequality at the EU level into the 
various Kaya factors. 
18
 In the Europe East zone, energy intensity dropped from 359 to 193 over the same period. 
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are therefore somewhat more homogeneous as a result of this factor’s smaller 
contribution to within-group inequality.  
 
TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
In this study, we have made the first analysis of the polarisation of CO2 
emissions per capita for the countries of the European Union from 1990 to 
2007. The study offers an in-depth examination of the measurement of a 
distributional characteristic closely related to the likelihood of reaching 
agreements on mitigation policy, a crucial aspect in the current context of EU 
policies and strategies to mitigate climate change. 
 
In this analysis, we used the EGR indices (Esteban et al., 2007), which are 
designed for analysing polarisation in general (i.e. regardless of the number of 
groups) and take into account the error committed in the formation of groups. 
We also used the Z-K polarisation index (Zhang and Kanbur, 2001), which 
allows the analysis of polarisation with exogenous groups (in our case, three 
regional groups: Europe North, Europe South and Europe East) and the 
decomposition of the results by explanatory factors.  
 
Our findings revealed a considerable non-linear decrease in polarisation 
concentrated between the mid-1990s and the present day. Most of this 
decrease can be attributed to the convergence of the various groups in terms of 
emissions per capita (i.e. antagonism between the groups has decreased). In 
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the endogenous analysis, segmentation of the countries into two or three poles 
was found to be very appropriate, with a low level of information loss associated 
with the grouping. In the analysis of the polarisation with exogenous groups—
which showed an evolution qualitatively similar to that of the polarisation with 
endogenous groups—we confirmed that the decrease in polarisation can be 
attributed to the lower degree of antagonism between the groups, which can 
largely be explained by the lower contribution of the energy intensity factor. 
Indeed, energy intensity goes from being the main factor explaining the 
divergence among the groups to playing a role in reducing this divergence, a 
phenomenon explained by the strong negative between-group correlation 
between energy intensity and affluence. The internal coherence of the groups 
increased slightly, but this effect was easily offset by the decreased antagonism 
between the groups.  
 
In short, we found that the overall reduction in emissions per capita in the 
European Union has coincided with a considerable reduction both in the 
polarisation of the distribution and in inequality. The overall evolution has thus 
been marked by a process of convergence among the countries, which tends to 
reduce tension in negotiations and increase the likelihood of reaching 
agreements on common mitigation policies at an EU level. Nevertheless, 
despite the reduced level of divergence in the distribution, the chances of 
reaching such an agreement are also heavily influenced by the degree of 
overall sacrifice required. If drastic levels of greenhouse-gas reduction are 
required—greater than 50% or 80%, as is recommended to help stabilise 
atmospheric gases at levels considered to be reasonable—then the persistence 
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and evolution of distributional differences will continue to be highly relevant 
factors in discussions about mitigation agreements.  
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Note: 1990 = 100 
Source: Drawn up by the authors using International Energy Agency data (IEA, 2010a). 
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Figure 2. Evolution of density functions of the international distribution of 
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Source: Drawn up by the authors using International Energy Agency data (IEA, 2010a). 
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Figure 3. Evolution of cross-country European Union endogenous 




























































































Note: 1990 = 100. EGRs are based on  = 1 and  = 1.3. 
Source: Drawn up by the authors using International Energy Agency data (IEA, 2010a).  
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Table 1. Two-group inter-country polarisation of CO2 emissions per capita 
in the European Union, 1990–2007 
  = 1  = 1.3  = 1.6 
 ER  EGR ER  EGR ER  EGR 
1990 0.1296 0.0402 0.0894 0.1053 0.0402 0.0651 0.0855 0.0402 0.0453 
1991 0.1293 0.0329 0.0965    0.1050 
 
0.0329 0.0722    0.0853 
 
0.0329 0.0525 
1992    0.1247 
 
   0.0296 
 
0.0951    0.1013 
 
   0.0296 
 
0.0717    0.0823 
 
   0.0296 
 
0.0527 
1993 0.1298 0.0317 0.0981 0.1054 0.0317 0.0737 0.0857 0.0317 0.0539 
1994 0.1289 0.0323 0.0966 0.1048 0.0323 0.0725 0.0851 0.0323 0.0528 
1995 0.1181 0.0325 0.0856 0.0960 0.0325 0.0634 0.0780 0.0325 0.0455 
1996 0.1251 0.0339 0.0912 0.1017 0.0339 0.0678 0.0826 0.0339 0.0487 
1997 0.1165 0.0339 0.0827 0.0947 0.0339 0.0608 0.0769 0.0339 0.0431 
1998 0.1075 0.0365 0.0710 0.0873 0.0365 0.0509 0.0710 0.0365 0.0345 
1999 0.1019 0.0374 0.0645 0.0828 0.0374 0.0454 0.0673 0.0374 0.0299 
2000 0.1042 0.0381 0.0661 0.0850 0.0381 0.0469 0.0695 0.0381 0.0314 
2001 0.1064 0.0362 0.0702 0.0867 0.0362 0.0505 0.0707 0.0362 0.0345 
2002 0.1019 0.0364 0.0655 0.0830 0.0364 0.0466 0.0677 0.0364 0.0313 
2003 0.1027 0.0374 0.0653 0.0836 0.0374 0.0462 0.0682 0.0374 0.0308 
2004 0.1001 0.0379 0.0622 0.0815 0.0379 0.0436 0.0665 0.0379 0.0286 
2005 0.0915 0.0364 0.0551 0.0745 0.0364 0.0381 0.0608 0.0364 0.0244 
2006 0.0963 0.0387 0.0576 0.0784 0.0387 0.0397 0.0640 0.0387 0.0253 
2007 0.0954 0.0398 0.0557 0.0775 0.0398 0.0377 0.0630 0.0398 0.0232 
 
Note: The table shows the results for ER (Esteban and Ray, 1994) and EGR (Esteban et al., 
2007) measures of polarisation, and error terms (ε), for extreme and intermediate α parameters 
(sensitivity of the measures to polarisation). 
Source: Drawn up by the authors using International Energy Agency data (IEA, 2010a). 
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Table 2. Description of two-group case: population share and relative 
emissions per capita of each group 
 Group 1 Group 2 
 p1 e1/e p2 e2/e 
1990 0.49 0.73 0.51 1.25 
1991 0.50 0.74 0.50 1.26 
1992 0.51 0.76 0.49 1.25 
1993 0.51 0.75 0.49 1.26 
1994 0.52 0.75 0.48 1.27 
1995 0.52 0.77 0.48 1.25 
1996 0.52 0.76 0.48 1.26 
1997 0.52 0.78 0.48 1.24 
1998 0.52 0.79 0.48 1.22 
1999 0.52 0.80 0.48 1.21 
2000 0.57 0.82 0.43 1.25 
2001 0.56 0.81 0.44 1.24 
2002 0.56 0.82 0.44 1.23 
2003 0.56 0.82 0.44 1.23 
2004 0.56 0.82 0.44 1.23 
2005 0.56 0.84 0.44 1.21 
2006 0.56 0.83 0.44 1.22 
2007 0.48 0.80 0.52 1.19 
 
Note: The first column for each group shows population weight (pi). The second column for each 
group shows the ratio between emissions per capita of the group (ei) and the European average 
(e). 
Source: Drawn up by the authors using International Energy Agency data (IEA, 2010a). 
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Table 3. Three-group inter-country polarisation of CO2 emissions per 
capita in the European Union, 1990–2007 
 
  = 1  = 1.3  = 1.6 
 ER  EGR ER  EGR ER  EGR 
1990 0.1065 0.0188 0.0877 0.0796 0.0188 0.0608 0.0600 0.0188 0.0412 
1991 0.1052 0.0153 0.0899 0.0788 0.0153 0.0635 0.0595 0.0153 0.0442 
1992 0.1023 0.0150 0.0873 0.0775 0.0150 0.0626 0.0594 0.0150 0.0444 
1993 0.1048 0.0163 0.0884 0.0787 0.0163 0.0624 0.0596 0.0163 0.0433 
1994 0.1043 0.0165 0.0878 0.0783 0.0165 0.0619 0.0593 0.0165 0.0428 
1995 0.0909 0.0138 0.0770 0.0655 0.0138 0.0517 0.0473 0.0138 0.0335 
1996 0.0939 0.0166 0.0773 0.0676 0.0166 0.0510 0.0487 0.0166 0.0321 
1997 0.0899 0.0141 0.0758 0.0646 0.0141 0.0506 0.0465 0.0141 0.0324 
1998 0.0856 0.0142 0.0714 0.0615 0.0142 0.0473 0.0443 0.0142 0.0301 
1999 0.0815 0.0159 0.0656 0.0586 0.0159 0.0427 0.0422 0.0159 0.0263 
2000 0.0853 0.0165 0.0688 0.0621 0.0165 0.0456 0.0453 0.0165 0.0288 
2001 0.0859 0.0163 0.0697 0.0625 0.0163 0.0463 0.0456 0.0163 0.0294 
2002 0.0810 0.0157 0.0653 0.0588 0.0157 0.0432 0.0430 0.0157 0.0273 
2003 0.0814 0.0165 0.0649 0.0590 0.0165 0.0425 0.0429 0.0165 0.0264 
2004 0.0811 0.0148 0.0663 0.0588 0.0148 0.0439 0.0428 0.0148 0.0280 
2005 0.0748 0.0142 0.0607 0.0542 0.0142 0.0400 0.0394 0.0142 0.0252 
2006 0.0796 0.0142 0.0654 0.0577 0.0142 0.0435 0.0421 0.0142 0.0279 
2007 0.0791 0.0152 0.0639 0.0574 0.0152 0.0422 0.0418 0.0152 0.0267 
 
Note: The table shows the results for ER (Esteban and Ray, 1994) and EGR (Esteban et al., 
2007) measures of polarisation, and error terms (ε), for extreme and intermediate α parameters 
(sensitivity of the measures to polarisation). 
Source: Drawn up by the authors using International Energy Agency data (IEA, 2010a). 
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Table 4. Description of three-group case: population share and relative 
emissions per capita of each group 
 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
 p1 e1/e p2 e2/e p3 e3/e 
1990 0.49 0.73 0.29 1.11 0.23 1.44 
1991 0.49 0.74 0.25 1.10 0.27 1.39 
1992 0.51 0.76 0.22 1.12 0.27 1.36 
1993 0.49 0.74 0.24 1.11 0.27 1.38 
1994 0.49 0.74 0.24 1.10 0.27 1.38 
1995 0.37 0.72 0.36 1.02 0.27 1.36 
1996 0.35 0.70 0.38 1.01 0.27 1.38 
1997 0.35 0.71 0.38 1.01 0.28 1.35 
1998 0.35 0.73 0.38 1.00 0.28 1.34 
1999 0.35 0.73 0.38 1.01 0.28 1.31 
2000 0.26 0.69 0.33 0.93 0.40 1.26 
2001 0.26 0.69 0.34 0.92 0.40 1.26 
2002 0.26 0.69 0.46 0.98 0.28 1.31 
2003 0.27 0.70 0.45 0.99 0.28 1.32 
2004 0.27 0.69 0.45 1.00 0.28 1.31 
2005 0.27 0.70 0.44 1.01 0.28 1.27 
2006 0.27 0.69 0.45 1.01 0.28 1.29 
2007 0.27 0.69 0.45 1.01 0.28 1.29 
 
Note: The first column for each group shows population weight (pi). The second column for each 
group shows the ratio between emissions per capita of the group (ei) and the European average 
(e). 
Source: Drawn up by the authors using International Energy Agency data (IEA, 2010a). 
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Table 5. Four-group inter-country polarisation of CO2 emissions per capita 
in the European Union, 1991–2007 
 
  = 1  = 1.3  = 1.6 
 ER  EGR ER  EGR ER  EGR 
1990 0.0796 0.0094 0.0702 0.0525 0.0094 0.0431 0.0347 0.0094 0.0253 
1991 0.0785 0.0079 0.0706 0.0523 0.0079 0.0444 0.0349 0.0079 0.0270 
1992 0.0758 0.0068 0.0690 0.0507 0.0068 0.0440 0.0341 0.0068 0.0273 
1993 0.0814 0.0062 0.0751 0.0547 0.0062 0.0485 0.0369 0.0062 0.0306 
1994 0.0810 0.0065 0.0745 0.0544 0.0065 0.0479 0.0367 0.0065 0.0302 
1995 0.0759 0.0062 0.0697 0.0510 0.0062 0.0449 0.0344 0.0062 0.0282 
1996 0.0797 0.0071 0.0726 0.0536 0.0071 0.0465 0.0361 0.0071 0.0290 
1997 0.0765 0.0072 0.0692 0.0518 0.0072 0.0446 0.0352 0.0072 0.0280 
1998 0.0694 0.0090 0.0604 0.0465 0.0090 0.0375 0.0312 0.0090 0.0222 
1999 0.0665 0.0093 0.0572 0.0442 0.0093 0.0350 0.0295 0.0093 0.0202 
2000 0.0696 0.0094 0.0603 0.0469 0.0094 0.0375 0.0316 0.0094 0.0223 
2001 0.0693 0.0088 0.0605 0.0464 0.0088 0.0376 0.0311 0.0088 0.0223 
2002 0.0676 0.0077 0.0600 0.0453 0.0077 0.0376 0.0304 0.0077 0.0227 
2003 0.0688 0.0087 0.0601 0.0463 0.0087 0.0376 0.0312 0.0087 0.0225 
2004 0.0675 0.0076 0.0599 0.0452 0.0076 0.0376 0.0303 0.0076 0.0227 
2005 0.0624 0.0073 0.0551 0.0418 0.0073 0.0345 0.0280 0.0073 0.0207 
2006 0.0665 0.0078 0.0586 0.0447 0.0078 0.0368 0.0301 0.0078 0.0222 
2007 0.0635 0.0088 0.0547 0.0419 0.0088 0.0331 0.0277 0.0088 0.0189 
 
Note: The table shows the results for ER (Esteban and Ray, 1994) and EGR (Esteban et al., 
2007) measures of polarisation, and error terms (ε), for extreme and intermediate α parameters 
(sensitivity of the measures to polarisation). 
Source: Drawn up by the authors using International Energy Agency data (IEA, 2010a). 
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Note: The figures show the ratio (Theil between/Theil total). 
Source: Drawn up by the authors using International Energy Agency data (IEA, 2010a). 
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Table 7. Coefficients of correlation between inequality and polarisation 
indexes 
    
 Gini Theil (0) Theil (1) CV 
EGR2 (1,1) 0.94 0.89 0.91 0.87 
EGR2 (1.3,1) 0.93 0.88 0.90 0.86 
EGR2 (1.6,1) 0.92 0.87 0.88 0.84 
EGR3 (1,1) 0.95 0.92 0.94 0.92 
EGR3 (1.3,1) 0.92 0.89 0.92 0.90 
EGR3 (1.6,1) 0.89 0.86 0.89 0.88 
EGR4 (1,1) 0.93 0.87 0.89 0.84 
EGR4 (1.3,1) 0.88 0.81 0.83 0.78 
EGR4 (1.6,1) 0.82 0.75 0.77 0.71 
 
Note: Pearson correlations. The polarisation measures are the EGR (α, β) for 2, 3 and 4 groups. 
Source: Drawn up by the authors using International Energy Agency data (IEA, 2010a). 
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Table 8: Examples of significant differences between polarisation and 
inequality measures in the context of EU international distribution of CO2 
emissions  
Sub-periods EGR (2) EGR(3) EGR(4) G T(0) T(1) CV 
1990–1991 0.7% 1.4% 0.9% 5.1% -10.6% -10.7% -14.7% 
1991–1992 -2.7% 0.3% -9.3% -4.5% 10.5% 9.0% 5.3% 
1993–1994 14.4% 19.7% 6.7% 7.0% -12.6% -13.2% -13.6% 
1994–1995 -6.5% 1.4% -3.4% -5.3% 10.9% 10.9% 14.3% 
1995–1996 11.5% 0.8% 4.3% 5.7% -9.9% -10.2% -12.7% 
1996–1997 19.4% 7.0% 18.9% 4.5% -6.0% -7.4% -8.7% 
1997–1998 12.1% 10.8% 7.1% 3.4% 1.3% -2.2% -6.5% 
1998–1999 -3.2% -6.4% -6.7% -2.1% 3.3% 3.8% 4.8% 
2000–2001 8.4% 7.2% 0.0% 3.1% -4.6% -4.7% -5.6% 
2003–2004 14.4% 9.7% 9.0% 7.8% -12.0% -12.4% -13.9% 
2004–2005 -4.0% -8.0% -6.2% -5.2% 7.5% 8.4% 9.1% 
1990–1992 10.1% 3.0% 2.1% -9.1% -17.8% -18.2% -23.2% 
1998–2000 -7.9% -3.6% 0.0% -1.2% 4.6% 1.5% -2.0% 
2002–2004 -6.4% 1.6% 0.0% -0.3% 0.2% 0.8% 4.2% 
1990–1993 13.2% 2.6% 12.5% -4.9% -9.2% -10.8% -19.2% 
1999–2002 2.6% 1.2% 7.4% -0.7% -4.6% -2.5% 0.4% 
1990–1994 11.4% 1.8% 11.1% -5.0% -10.2% -11.8% -20.8% 
1992–1996 -5.4% -18.5% 5.7% 3.1% 6.0% 3.8% 1.9% 
1998–2002 -8.4% -8.7% 0.3% -3.9% -3.4% -4.6% -6.2% 
1999–2003 1.8% -0.5% 7.4% 0.6% -3.5% -0.3% 6.5% 
2000–2004 -7.0% -3.7% 0.3% -3.0% -7.4% -5.3% -0.2% 
2002–2006 -14.8% 0.7% -2.1% -2.5% -5.2% -4.2% -2.1% 
1990–1996 4.1% -16.1% 7.9% -6.3% -12.9% -15.1% -21.8% 
 
Note: EGR indexes are based on moderate parameters  = 1 and  = 1.3. 
Source: Drawn up by the authors using International Energy Agency data (IEA, 2010a).  
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1990 0.0156 0.0311 0.5026 
1991 0.0153 0.0276 0.5540 
1992 0.0121 0.0262 0.4624 
1993 0.0126 0.0298 0.4250 
1994 0.0122 0.0297 0.4119 
1995 0.0090 0.0276 0.3280 
1996 0.0122 0.0284 0.4311 
1997 0.0085 0.0281 0.3028 
1998 0.0091 0.0253 0.3604 
1999 0.0083 0.0266 0.3104 
2000 0.0079 0.0282 0.2788 
2001 0.0082 0.0267 0.3077 
2002 0.0075 0.0258 0.2902 
2003 0.0069 0.0268 0.2572 
2004 0.0062 0.0272 0.2280 
2005 0.0047 0.0246 0.1914 
2006 0.0044 0.0271 0.1633 
2007 0.0033 0.0284 0.1162 
 
Note: The groups are Europe North, Europe South and Europe East. The Z-K (Zhang and 
Kambur, 2001) index of polarisation is computed as the ratio Tb/Tw. 
Source: Drawn up by the authors using International Energy Agency data (IEA, 2010a). 
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Table 10. Decomposition of between-group inequality component into 




Note: The percentage with respect to between-group inequality is shown in brackets.  











1990 0.0156 -0.0026 0.0150 0.0031 
  (-16.3%) (96.3%) (20.0%) 
1995 0.0090 -0.0055 -0.0019 0.0163 
  (-60.6%) (-20.8%) (181.4%) 
2000 0.0079 -0.0066 -0.0118 0.0261 
  (-85.7%) (-153.2%) (339.0%) 
2005 0.0047 -0.0049 -0.0097 0.0193 
  (-104.3%) (-206.4%) (410.6%) 
2007 0.0033 -0.0042 -0.0082 0.0157 
  (-125.8%) (-249.2%) (475.0%) 
% change -78.8% 62.8% -154.7% 401.6% 
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Table 11. Characteristics of exogenous groups in relation to the EU as 
















1990      
North 0.93 0.99 1.20 1.11 52.9% 
South 1.05 0.66 1.04 0.72 24.7% 
East 1.17 1.87 0.48 1.06 22.4% 
2000      
North 0.92 1.00 1.20 1.11 53.8% 
South 1.09 0.80 1.04 0.91 24.7% 
East 1.20 1.53 0.45 0.83 21.5% 
2007      
North 0.92 0.99 1.18 1.07 53.8% 
South 1.11 0.86 0.99 0.94 25.6% 
East 1.17 1.36 0.56 0.89 20.6% 
 
Note: The value 1 corresponds to the world average for each year and factor. The last column 
shows the share of EU population of each group. 
Source: Drawn up by the authors using International Energy Agency data (IEA, 2010a, 2010b, 
2010c). 
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Table 12. Decomposition of within-group inequality component by Kaya 









1990 0.0311 0.0196 0.0034 0.0081 
  (63.1%) (10.9%) (26.0%) 
1995 0.0276 0.0192 0.0018 0.0067 
  (69.4%) (6.4%) (24.2%) 
2000 0.0282 0.0176 0.0027 0.0079 
  (62.6%) (9.4%) (27.9%) 
2005 0.0246 0.0162 0.0032 0.0052 
  (65.9%) (13.0%) (21.1%) 
2007 0.0284 0.0187 0.0043 0.0053 
  (65.9%) (15.3%) (18.8%) 
% change -8.7% -4.6% 28.1% -34.1% 
 
Source: Drawn up by the authors using International Energy Agency data (IEA, 2010a, 2010b, 
2010c). 




Table A.1. Groups of countries determined endogenously by polarisation 
analysis 
 













































































































































































































































































Note: The percentage with respect to between-group inequality is shown in brackets. 








inequality CO2/EP EP/GDP GDP/P Corra,by Corrb,y 
1990 0.0311 0.0203 0.0084 0.0131 -0.0015 -0.0093 
  (65.5%) (27.1%) (42.3%) (-4.8%) (-30.0%) 
1995 0.0276 0.0207 0.0072 0.0121 -0.0031 -0.0093 
  (75.0%) (26.1%) (43.8%) (-11.2%) (-33.7%) 
2000 0.0282 0.0197 0.0087 0.0139 -0.0042 -0.0100 
  (70.1%) (31.0%) (49.5%) (-14.9%) (-35.6%) 
2005 0.0246 0.0215 0.0085 0.0105 -0.0106 -0.0053 
  (87.4%) (34.6%) (42.7%) (-43.1%) (-21.5%) 
2007 0.0284 0.0232 0.0090 0.0100 -0.0091 -0.0048 
  (82.0%) (31.8%) (35.3%) (-32.2%) (-17.0%) 
% change -8.7% 14.3% 7.1% -23.7% 506.7% -48.4% 
 
Note: The percentage with respect to within-group inequality is shown in brackets. 







inequality CO2/EP EP/GDP GDP/P Corra.by Corrb.y 
1990 0.0156 0.0045 0.0688 0.0569 -0.0141 -0.1005 
  (28.8%) (441.0%) (364.7%) (-90.4%) (-644.2%) 
1995 0.0090 0.0054 0.0508 0.0690 -0.0217 -0.0945 
  (60.0%) (564.4%) (766.7%) (-241.1%) (-1050.0%) 
2000 0.0079 0.0062 0.0259 0.0638 -0.0256 -0.0626 
  (80.5%) (336.4%) (828.6%) (-332.5%) (-813.0%) 
2005 0.0047 0.0060 0.0155 0.0445 -0.0218 -0.0395 
  (127.7%) (329.8%) (946.8%) (-463.8%) (-840.4%) 
2007 0.0033 0.0058 0.0129 0.0368 -0.0199 -0.0323 
  (175.8%) (390.9%) (1115.2%) (-603.0%) (-978.8%) 
% change -78.8% 28. 9% -81.3% -35.3 41.1 -67.9 
